Knowledge economy gaps, policy syndromes and catch-up strategies by Asongu, Simplice A
1  
Knowledge Economy Gaps, Policy Syndromes and Catch-up Strategies: Fresh 
South Korean Lessons to Africa 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute, 
P.O. Box 18 SOA/ 1365 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Africa’s overall knowledge index fell between 2000 and 2009. South Korea’s economic miracle 
is largely due to a knowledge-based development strategy that holds valuable lessons for African 
countries in their current pursuit towards knowledge economies. Using updated data (1996-2010), 
this paper presents fresh South Korean lessons to Africa by assessing the knowledge economy 
(KE) gaps, deriving policy syndromes and providing catch-up strategies. The 53 African frontier 
countries are decomposed into fundamental characteristics of wealth, legal origins, regional 
proximity, oil-exporting, political stability and landlockedness. The World Bank’s four KE 
components are used: education, innovation, information & communication technology (ICT) 
and economic incentives & institutional regime. Absolute beta and sigma convergence techniques 
are employed as empirical strategies. With the exception of ICT for which catch-up is not very 
apparent, in increasing order it is visible in: innovation, economic incentives, education and 
institutional regime. The speed of catch-up varies between 8.66% and 30.00% per annum with 
respective time to full or 100% catch-up of 34.64 years and 10 years. Based on the trends and 
dynamics in the KE gaps, policy syndromes and compelling catch-up strategies are discussed. 
Issues standing on the way to KE in Africa are dissected with great acuteness before South 
Korean relevant solutions are provided. The paper is original in its provision of practical policy 
initiatives drawn from the Korean experience to African countries embarking on a transition to 
KE. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The phenomenon of globalization has become an ineluctable process whose challenges 
can be neglected only by sacrificing the prosperity of nations. It is increasingly relevant today 
that for nations to be competitive and integrated into or involved in the world economy, they have 
to play by competitive-rules that come with embracing globalization. Twenty-first century 
competition is centered on knowledge economy (KE), a golden rule that has emerge as a key 
theme in the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank 
reports since the start of the third millennium (World Bank, 2007; Weber, 2011). 
It is in this spirit that the dynamics of KE have been mastered by North America and 
Europe, who are inexorably charting the course of development in the international arena. In 
calculated steps, Latin America and Asia have been growingly asserting the need for KE in their 
pursuits  of  national  and  regional  initiatives  (Dahlan,  2007;  Chandra  &  Yokoyama,  2011).  The 
historic pattern formulated by Japan has set the course for China, Malaysia and the Newly 
Industrialized Economies of Asia (Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong & South Korea).    These 
nations have been witnessing a remarkable march from post-industrialization era ‘product-based 
economies’ to ‘knowledge-based economies’. The East Asian Miracle has left many scholars and 
policy makers debating on the implications and lessons for Africa (Kim, 2013). Among the 
Newly Industrialized Economies of Asia, South Korea has increasingly been the object of 
comparison with African countries because it was far less developed than most countries in the 
continent in the aftermath of colonial independence (Tran, 2011). Aware of the fact that 21st 
 
development is KE-centered and Africa’s lagging global position in KE, Korea’s KE experience 
is an important benchmark for development prospects in the continent, especially when its overall 
knowledge index fell between 2000 and 2009 (Anyanwu, 2012). 
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While a substantial portion of the literature has been devoted to the emerging econom ies 
of Latin America and Asia, very scanty scholarly attention has been devoted to African countries 
(Dahlan, 2007; Chavula, 2010; Chandra & Yokoyama, 2011). However, in recent years KE 
themes  have  been  increasingly  taking  central  stage  in  discussions  on  development  in  the 
continent (AfDB, 2007; Amavilah, 2009; Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; Nyarko, 
2013a;  Andrés  et  al.,  2014).  Indeed,  a  recent  stream    of    literature  is  consistent  with  the 
imperative for urgent policy measures needed to foster the drive towards African KE, inter alia: 
general discourses about KE in the continent (Rooney, 2005; Lin, 2006; Anyanwu, 2012); 
education  (Ford,  2007;  Weber,  2011);  information &  communication technologies (Butcher, 
2011); innovation (Carisle et al., 2013); institutional regime & economic incentives (Cogburn, 
 
2003; Letiche, 2006); intellectual capital & economic development (Wagiciengo & Belal, 2012; 
Preece, 2013); indigenous knowledge systems (Raseroka, 2008; Lwoga et al., 2010); research & 
development  (German  &  Stroud,  2007;  Sumberg,  2005);  intellectual  property rights (Zerbe, 
2005; Lor & Britz, 2005; Myburgh, 2011; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; Andrés et al., 2014; 
Asongu, 2013a); spatiality in knowledge production (Bidwell et al., 2011; Neimark, 2012) and 
KE in the transformation of space (Moodley, 2003; Maswera et al., 2008). 
The above narratives are also predominantly motivated by the need for greater emphasize 
on KE-based research that focuses on strategies towards bridging the gaps between benchmark 
countries (AfDB, 2007; Bizri, 2009; Aubert, 2005; Britz et al., 2006; Chavula, 2010 ; Makinda, 
2007; Lightfoot, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, there is yet no African KE study that has 
addressed this concern with respect to benchmark Newly Industrialized Asian countries. The 
present paper aims to investigate the gaps in KE between Africa and South Korea. Based on 
assessed gaps,  we provide recommendations from resulting catch-up policy syndromes. The 
updated dataset (1996-2010) essential for fresh policy measures also enables us to examine if the 
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impressive growth experienced by some African countries during the past decade has been 
accompanied by similar patterns of catch-up in KE dimensions relative to South Korea. 
In line with Suh & Chen (2007), the dramatic economic prosperity experienced by South 
Korea since the 1960s that enabled it to emerge from a low-income country to a high-income 
industrialized nation could substantially be attributed to the accumulation of knowledge rather 
than to traditional factors of labor and capital in production. According to the narrative, Korea 
was able to achieve this knowledge-oriented prosperity by: heavily investing in training and 
education; developing accessible and modern information infrastructure; using intensi ve research 
& development (R&D) to boost innovation; focusing on economic incentives and a favorable 
institutional regime that were conducive to boosting knowledge-oriented investments. In this 
light, the country has been able to use KE as an engine for growth: an experience that could offer 
lessons for developing countries, especially frontier African nations that were at the same 
development threshold as the core country in the 1960s. 
The Korea-Africa relationship is a relatively little studied nexus in contemporary 
development literature (Kim, 2013). This is probably due to the skepticism about South Korea as 
a role model of development for other countries1. However recent evidence suggests that the core 
country can serve as a role model of development for other emerging countries, particularly in 
terms of KE (Lee, 2009). By using the South Korean KE experience are a core model for frontier 
African countries, the paper also extends a recent stream of studies on ‘achieving development 
success: strategies and lessons from the developing world’ (Fosu, 2013a; Lee, 2013; Jomo & 
Wee, 2013; Warr, 2013; Thoburn, 2013; Khan, 2013; Singh, 2013; Yao, 2013; Santos-Paulino, 
2013; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Subramanian, 2013; Lundahl & Petersson, 
 
 
 
1 “There is some scepticism about Korea as role model of development as the Korean model involved a considerable 
degree of state activism, unacceptable in today’s global environment” (Lee, 2009, p.1). 
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2013; Fosu, 2013b; Naudé, 2013; De Mello, 2013; Solimano, 2013; Trejos, 2013; Pozo et al., 
 
2013; Cardoso, 2013; Looney, 2013; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; Nyarko, 2013b & Drine, 2013). 
 
In light of the above, by positioning this paper on the important development concern of 
KE and the relatively little investigated Korean-African nexus; this study contributes to existing 
literature by addressing the following policy issues. First, the paper provides a KE diagnosis on 
the current growth situation and prospects of frontier African countries by:  investigating the KE 
gaps in relation to a core country (South Korea) and; providing compelling catch-up policies to 
bridge the KE gaps. Second, the study also presents a unique opportunity of examining whether 
the impressive growth experienced over the last decade by African countries has moved hand-in- 
hand with identical catch-up trends in KE, relative to South Korea.  Third, in response to a 
growing strand of studies on the need for KE as the main axis of future development (Makinda, 
2007;  Lightfoot,  2011),  a  comparison  with  South  Korea  is  ideal  in  understanding  growth 
prospects of Africa. Accordingly, very practical policy lessons are offered to African countries 
already embarking on the route to KE. Fourth, the decomposition of frontier countries into 
fundamental characteristics of income levels, legal origins, openness to sea, political stability, 
natural resources and regional proximity, enable comparative insights for more focused policy 
implications. 
The intuition and theoretical motivations underpinning this KE catch-up are typically in 
line with cross-country income convergence literature substantially documented within the 
framework of neoclassical models growth and recently extended to other fields of economic 
development (Swan, 1956; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992; Solow, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro 
& Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Narayan et al., 2011; Andrés & Asongu, 2013ab; Fung, 2009 ; 
Mayer-Foulkes,  2010;  Bruno  et  al.,  2012;  Asongu,  2014abc,  2013abc).  In  this  light,  the 
theoretical underpinnings have been used in the harmonization/timing/modeling of: intellectual 
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property rights (IPRs) on  software piracy (Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & Asongu, 2013b), common 
measures in the fight against capital flight (Asongu, 2014d, 2013d), the future of KE (Asongu, 
2013e,f,g); as well as the health of currency areas and financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; 
Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013b, 2014b; Asongu, 2013ch, 2014c). 
The  World  Bank’s  four  dimensions  of  the  Knowledge  Economy  Index  (KEI)  are 
employed, notably: information & communication technology (ICT), innovation, economic 
incentives  &  institutional  regime  and  education.  This  employment  of  a  plethora  of  KE 
dimensions is essentially motivated by the fact that existing literature has focused only on one or 
a few KEI components (Aubert, 2005; Britz et al., 2006; AfDB, 2007; Bizri, 2009). The empirical 
evidence is based on 13 panels. Accordingly, because of the richness of the dataset, we are able 
to disaggregate countries into fundamental characteristics of KE based on income-levels, legal 
origins, petroleum-exporting, openness to sea, political stability and regional proximity. Three 
main issues are investigated between the homogenous panels and South Korea: KE gaps or 
evidence of catch-up, the speed or rate of catch-up and the corresponding time needed for full 
catch-up. To ensure robustness in the assessments, both sigma and beta catch-up empirical 
strategies are employed. Based on the findings of the three concerns assessed, we are able to 
provide catch-up policies necessary to bridge the KE gaps. 
Beside   specific   policy   recommendations   that   would   emerge   from   the   catch-up 
estimations, we are comfortable that four main categories of policy implications would emerge 
from the proposed study. First, the presence or not of catch-up informs policy makers on the 
various KE gaps vis-à-vis South Korea. Second, decomposing Africa into fundamental 
characteristics (legal origins, income-levels…etc), provides the analytical subtlety needed for 
more  targeted  policy implications.  Third,  the  rate  of  convergence  and  time  needed  for  full 
convergence inform policy makers about the urgency of measures needed for bridging the KE 
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gaps. Fourth, common catch-up trends among fundamental characteristics are relevant in 
informing policy on the effectiveness of current regional integration efforts in the investigated 
KE dimensions. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data 
and methodology are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis, discussion 
of results and policy implications. We conclude with Section 5. 
 
2. Knowledge Economy in Africa and the South Korean Development Model 
 
2.1 Knowledge Economy in Africa 
 
The present extant of literature on African KE can be summarized into eleven main 
strands: general discourses on KE, education, ICT, innovation, institutional regime & economic 
incentives, intellectual capital & economic development, indigenous knowledge systems, R&D, 
IPRs,  spatiality in knowledge production and, KE in the transformation of space. 
The first strand concerns the general discourses about KE. Rooney (2005) had earlier 
analyzed the dominant discourses on knowledge, society, technology and economy to conclude 
that they are limited in various dimensions, inter alia: KE understanding and technocracy.  Lin 
(2006) has criticized the mainstream growth-focused exposition of KE by rethinking the KE- 
growth relationship and providing other important or neglected dimensions: the rel evance of 
knowledge in facilitating equality in wealth and environmental conservation. Anyanwu (2012) 
has recently assessed the state of knowledge in Africa with the perspective of indentifying key 
constraints and concluded that the continent does not compare well with advanced countries and 
other regions. According to the narrative, the KEI for the continent fell between 2000 and 2009. 
In  the  second  strand  on  education,  Ford  (2007)  has assessed  Africa’s stance on  the 
 
information highway and documented the state and critical challenges on the continent in the 
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digital age. Amavilah (20009) examines the production and value of doctoral dissertations and 
establishes that more investment is needed in the production of knowledge in the continent. 
Chavula (2010) investigates the role of knowledge in economic prosperity and concludes that 
African governments need to put more energy in KE promotion. Weber (2011) concludes that 
education ends illiteracy, preserves cultural integrity and diversifies the economy; after assessing 
the relevance of education in the KE of developing countries. Asongu (2013f) examines the 
future of scientific monopoly after the publication of the August 15th  2013 Shanghai university 
 
rankings to conclude that African countries are not catching-up with advanced nations. 
 
The third strand on ICT is motivated by the African Partnership Forum’s (2008) report 
which suggests that Africa is on the move and ICTs are essential in mitigating poverty and 
boosting economic prosperity. According to the narrative, ICTs improve efficiency, create novel 
opportunities for generating income, provide a voice to the poor, enable access to services or new 
markets and ameliorate governance. This stream of thought is broadly consistent with Chavula 
(2010) and Butcher (2011). 
On innovation in the fourth strand, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Gehl Sampath (2007) in their 
assessment of ‘innovation in African development’ have recognized the phenomenon as a major 
source of modern growth in productivity and prosperity of nations. Carisle et al. (2013) after 
investigating innovation for tourism concludes that institutions have a predominant mission in 
sustaining best practices, transfer of knowledge and networking. In substance, the need for 
innovation for development in the continent has been consistently raised in recent streams of KE 
literature (Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 2013eh). 
Institutional regime & economic incentives which make-up the fourth KE pillar constitute 
the fifth strand. Cogburn (2003) in trying to understand the transition in regimes of international 
telecommunications has provided insights into lessons and best practices for other emerging 
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countries. Letiche (2006) has used behavioral economics to understand the success of economic 
transitions and presented an interesting analysis on the transition economies with different 
traditions, customs…etc. Andrés et al. (2014) have recently assessed the relevance of formal 
institutions in African KE and concluded that with the instrumentality of IPRs, institutions are not 
a sufficient condition for KE. Andrés & Asongu (2013a) conclude that corruption-control is the 
most effective institutional mechanism in the fight against piracy. Surplus liquidity issues in 
African financial institutions have also been documented as one of the cause of slow economic 
activity (Saxegaard, 2006; Nguena & Tsafack, 2014). 
The sixth strand on ‘intellectual capital & economic development’ is mainly concerned 
with information disclosure and lifelong learning. Wagiciengo & Belal (2012) have engaged in 
an investigation of intellectual capital disclosure and concluded that the disclosure of intellectual 
capital is on the rise in African corporations. Preece (2013) has substantially discussed the nexus 
between an international ambition for lifelong learning and development assistance to poor 
countries and established that priorities in international aid have a negative incidence on how 
government policies and choices impact lifelong learning. 
‘Indigenous knowledge systems’ is the focus of the seventh strand. Roseroka (2008) has 
investigated how to salvage the indigenous knowledge space and presented a case for the relative 
advantage in oral knowledge.  Lwoga et al. (2010) apply knowledge management approaches to 
indigenous KE and conclude that the former can be used to manage the latter if distinct 
characteristics are accounted for. 
The eighth strand embodies R&D. Sumberg (2005) has examined the progress on the 
international architecture of agricultural research and concluded that the global systems of 
research are at odds with the realities of African research. German & Stroud (2007) investigate 
the application and understanding of R&D and present lessons, types, as well as implications of 
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learning approaches. In summary, the plethora of recent African KE literature has been consistent 
on the need to invest more in R&D (African Development Bank, 2007; Chavula, 2010; Anyanwu 
, 2012) especially to mitigate Western monopoly in scientific publications (Asongu, 2013fg). 
 
The  interesting  stream  of  IPRs  is  covered  in  the  ninth  strand.  Zerbe  (2005)  in 
investigating the African Union’s Legislation for the protection of Indigenous knowledge has 
concluded that it satisfies the requirements and needs of African countries by balancing the 
monopoly rights of breeders with those of the indigenous population. Lor & Britz (2005) examine 
the trends in knowledge as well as their incidence on the international flow of information and 
establish three ethical pillars to elucidate the flow: common good, social justice and human 
rights. Myburgh (2011) reviews legal processes in the protection of plant-oriented digital know- 
how and presents the perspective of an IPRs lawyer on recent variations in the protection of 
plant-based  traditional  knowledge.  Asongu  (2013a)  and  Andrés  &  Asongu  (2013b)  have 
presented timelines for the harmonization of IPRs in Africa and globally respectively. Based on 
the instrumentality or enforcement of IPRs, Andrés & Asongu (2013a) have established that 
corruption is the best tool in fighting software piracy whereas, Andrés et al. (2014) conclude 
formal institutions are not sufficient mechanisms for KE. 
On the spatiality of knowledge production in the tenth strand, Bidwell et al. (2001) have 
worked on how to adapt technology to rural community heritages and needs. They provide 
valuable insights into the manner in which a rural community temporarily and spatially manages 
information.  Neimark  (2012)  investigates  the  political  economy  of  bio -prospecting  and 
documents changes of the phenomenon in Madagascar. 
Finally, the last but not the least strand focuses on KE in the transformation of space. 
Moodley (2003) examines the relevance of electronic (e)-business in the apparel sector of South 
Africa: discussing the opportunities, challenges and risks of e-business in the sector. Maswera et 
11  
al. (2008) on their part investigate the degree by which e-commerce is being adopted in the 
tourism organization and conclude that, though websites in Africa are informative, they are 
deficient of interactive facilities for e-transactions. 
The eleven interesting strands above could be summarized into one sentence: the need for 
greater emphasis on KE in Africa as a development strategy: a South Korean model. 
 
2.2 South Korea as a Knowledge Economy and Development Model 
 
Consistent with Suh & Chen (2007), the South Korean republic has experienced one of 
the most spectacular growths in the 20th century, starting as a low-income nation in the 1950s to 
an industrialized OECD economy by the turn of the century. While a development strategy that 
clearly articulated knowledge was not apparent, development in the economy critically hinges on 
interactions between the four dimensions of the World Bank’s KEI, notably: innovation, 
education, ICT, economic incentives & institutional regime. Characteristics of the development 
model included, inter alia: human resource development fortified with technological capacity 
building and intensive learning processes, proactive leadership by government in providing 
sustaining  and  fostering  transformations,  promotion  of  export-  and  import-  substitution 
industries…etc. South Korea has often been used as a development model for Africa because it 
lagged behind most African countries even before the 1980s2. 
Consistent with Lee (2009) and Lee & Kim (2009), Korea can be used as a model for 
African countries because it has achieved so far one of the most successful rapid economic 
prosperities in recent history: from approximately 160 USD in per capita income in 1960 to about 
 
 
 
2 For instance, “After the Korean war, South Korea was one of the world's poorest countries with only $64 per capita 
income. Economically, in the 1960s it lagged behind the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – currently 
holding elections marred by violence . Since then the country's fortunes have diverged spectacularly. South Korea 
now belongs to the rich man's club, the OECD development assistance committee (DAC). The DRC has gone 
backwards since independence and, out of 187 countries, ranked bottom in the 2011 Human Development Index” 
(Tran, 2011). 
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20000 USD per capita GDP in 2007. According to the narrative, because of the skepticism over 
whether Korea could serve as a model for other developing nations, earlier literature focused on 
the mission of market versus government in catch-up processes (Amsden 1989; Chang 1994; 
World Bank 1993). This has been parallel to another stream of literature contending that Korea 
has been catching-up by assimilating and adapting to seemingly obsolete technology from 
advanced countries (Utterback, 1975; OECD, 1992; Hobday, 1995; Dahlman et al., 1985; Andrés 
& Asongu, 2013a; Andrés et al., 2014;  Asongu, 2013g, 2014g). 
 
Consistent with Andrés et al. (2014), the ongoing debate about the ‘East Asian miracle’ 
has been on ‘governing the market’ and/ ‘soft authoritarian’ concepts. It is based on the fact th at 
certain politico-economic conditions (especially in South Korea) have been conducive for the 
miracle. This narrative also sustains that some scholars advocate the miracle might have resulted 
from the low enforcement of IPRs at the early stages of development (Bezmen & Depken, 2004). 
This is consistent with the recent findings of Kim et al. (2012) who have concluded that the 
protection of patent is instrumental in innovation, with patentable innovation contributing to 
economic prosperity in developed, but not in developing countries (Kim et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, other authors have argued that there is nothing to be miraculous about the East Asian 
miracle (Lucas, 1988, 1993). A recent strand of KE literature has been substantially devoted to 
analyzing this miracle in the context of Africa. Notably:  the enforcement of IPRs through 
governance channels not being a sufficient condition for KE in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
Middle East & North African (MENA) countries (Andrés et al., 2014); timelines for the fight 
against piracy (Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & Asongu, 2013b);   corruption as the greatest fuel to 
software piracy and hence deterrence to the potential for KE (Andrés & Asongu, 2013da); how 
IPRs matter in the KE-finance nexus (Asongu, 2013h); the future of KE (Asongu, 2013e) & 
catch-up in scientific publications (Asongu, 2013fg); dynamics of financial sector competition & 
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KE (Asongu, 2014ef); how legal origins & IPRs protection channels matter in fight against piracy 
 
(Asongu, 2014g); the pro-poor character of software piracy (Asongu, 2014h), inter alia. 
 
In  the  catch-up  literature  specifically  positioned  on  South  Korea,  Lee  (2009)  has 
debunked the skepticism surrounding the Korean experience as a model for other developing 
countries by arguing that capacity building, standard trade openness and devaluation cannot result 
in sustained catch-up because they grease short-run and temporary booms for the most part.  The 
study has analyzed the manner in which Korea made use of various access modes to knowledge 
and learning in order to boost technological capabilities. The author has concluded that the 
Korean lessons are transferable to other countries, thus confirming an earlier report that 
recommended the Korean model to other developing countries (Suh & Chen, 2007). The present 
study is therefore a response to the above recommended future research directions. 
The paper is also an extension of a recent stream of studies on ‘achieving development 
success: strategies and lessons from the developing world’ (Fosu, 2012, 2013a) and learning from 
the past (Fosu, 2010). The recent stream of papers has focused on: South Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam in  East Asia & the Pacific (Lee, 2013; Jomo & Wee, 2013; Warr, 2013; 
Thoburn, 2013; Khan, 2013); the emerging Asian giants of China & India (Singh, 2013; Yao, 
2013; Santos-Paulino, 2013; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013); sub-Saharan Africa with examples of 
Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana and South Africa (Robinson, 2013; Subramanian, 2013; Lundahl & 
Petersson, 2013; Fosu, 2013b; Naudé, 2013); Latin America & the Caribbean in which emphasis 
is placed on Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile and the Dominican Republic (De Mello, 2013; Solimano, 
2013; Trejos, 2013; Pozo et al., 2013; Cardoso, 2013) and; the MENA region with analyses from 
Oman, Bahrain, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (Looney, 2013; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; 
Nyarko, 2013b;  Drine, 2013). 
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Starkly contrasting with the skeptical strand on lessons for developing countries (Lucas, 
 
1988, 1993; Lee, 2009), a common denominator to studies in the preceding paragraph is the 
position that compelling lessons could be conditionally drawn from other success developing 
countries. In other words, every developing success story has a dimension. Consistent with Fosu 
(2013a),   they  portray  a   substantial   diversity  in   development   strategies,   inter   alia:   the 
‘disinterested-government’ political economy of China; the high-sector and democratically based 
Indian development approaches; reforms in China & Ghana based on the ‘Washington- 
Consensus’; the strategies of diversification in Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)  & 
Oman; the optimal natural-resource management strategies of  the UAE, Oman, Botswana & 
Bahrain; the social-sector development programs underpinning progress in Tunisia & Costa Rica; 
the democratic political system of diversity management in India and; the dynamic orthodox - 
heterodox strategy in Vietnam & Malaysia. Inspired by above narratives, this paper is positioned 
on the KE success story of South Korea with particular emphasis on Africa. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We examine 53 African countries with data from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
and World Development Indicators for the period 1996-2010. The investigated interval begins 
from 1996 because government quality indicators essential for the institutional regime component 
of KE are not available before this year. The KE variables that are obtained from the former 
source are consistent with recent literature (Andrés et al., 2014; Andrés & Asongu, 2013b; 
Asongu, 2014efg). These KE variables include: innovation, ICT, education and, economic 
incentives  &  institutional  regime.  We  devote  space  to  discussing  the  determination  of 
fundamental characteristics in frontier African countries. These include: legal origins (English 
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common law versus (vs) French civil law), income-levels (low- vs middle-income), openness to 
sea (landlocked vs not landlocked), political stability (conflict-affected vs stability), regional 
proximity (sub-Saharan Africa vs North Africa) and natural resources (petroleum vs non- 
petroleum exporting) countries. The fundamental characteristics are in accordance with recent 
KE literature (Asongu & Andrés, 2013b). 
First, the basis of legal origin has foundations on the substantially documented evidence 
of  colonial  legacy  on  openness,  education  &  economic  growth  (Agbor,  2011),  institutional 
quality (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) and adaptation to changes in economic conditions (Beck et 
al., 2003). Agbor (2011) has recently documented that in Africa, English common law countries 
have a better educational system and economic incentives that have given them an edge in 
economic prosperity over their French civil law counterparts. In terms of institutional quality (or 
regime), the edge of English common law documented in pioneering law-finance literature (La 
Porta et al., 1998, 1999) has been recently confirmed in the African continent (Asongu, 2012ab). 
The underlying intuition for this categorization is that informal rules, formal norms and 
enforcement measures influence an institutional regime are necessary for KE. This narrative has a 
consensus that whereas French civil law places more emphasis on the power of the State, private 
property rights that are needed for KE is prioritized by English common law. The classification 
of countries in this dimension is in line with La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). 
Some practical issues could arise when classifying the ‘conflict-affected’ category. This is 
essentially because; it is not easy to assign a country to this strand in exclusive and non arbitrary 
manner. Some distinctions have to be made on the degree of significance and periodicity of 
instability because a country cannot be completely conflict-free. Hence, this strand is presented in 
two-groups. The first ‘civil war’ group entails:  Burundi (1993-2005), Chad (2005-2010), Angola 
(1975-2002), Côte d’Ivoire (1999 coup d’état, 2002-2007 civil war, rekindled in 2011), Sierra 
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Leone (1991-2002), Central African Republic (the wave of aborted coup d’états between 1996- 
 
2003 and the 2004-2007 Bush War), Congo Democratic Republic, Liberia (1999-2003), Sudan 
and Somalia. On the second group, despite the absence of formal characteristics of civil war, we 
include Zimbabwe and Nigeria due to the seriousness of internal strife. From logic and common 
sense, severe conflict and political strife inhibit a favorable KE environment. 
Third, in selecting petroleum-exporting countries two issues arise. On the one hand, a 
country could qualify only for part of the investigated periodicity either because of a recent oil 
discovery or substantial decline in production. On the other hand, some countries (e.g Botswana) 
have macroeconomic characteristics that are similar to those of oil-exporting countries. To tackle 
these constraints, we select only countries for which exports have been oil-dominated over the 
last decade and take a minimalistic approach in the categorization by adopting only oil -resource 
countries. These include: Angola, Algeria, Chad, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Nigeria, Libya and Sudan. 
Fourth, two main reasons motivate the dimension of wealth-effects with income-levels. 
On the one hand, economic prosperity should come with higher opportunities for KE; and on the 
other hand, the wealth of African nations has been documented to be instrumental in institutional 
quality necessary for KE (Asongu, 2012c). Consistent with Asongu (2014i), we use the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for the classification of wealth 
into low- and middle- income countries. 
Fifth, the distinction between North and sub-Saharan African countries has two premises. 
On the one hand, proximity to Europe is likely to influence the drive towards KE. On the other 
hand, in accordance with Boyce & Ndikumana (2008), the distinction is consistent with the 
World Bank’s regional classification in terms of policy implications. 
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Sixth, ‘openness to sea’ should provide a relative KE advantage, such that landlocked 
countries incur higher costs to competition and openness, essential to KE. This is also in 
accordance with the institutional price of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007). Conversely, 
landlockedness could predispose certain countries to devote more efforts towards developing KE 
(e.g Rwanda). 
It is important to note that in the categorization of frontier KE African countries, some 
nations could qualify for more than one category. In contrast to Weeks (2012), we have not 
imposed any constrains on categorical priority such that, a country may fall into as many 
categories as possible so long as it is consistent with the categorical features. Appendix 4 
summarizes  the  categorization  of  frontier  African  countries  discussed  above.  Variables  are 
defined in Appendix 1, the summary statistics presented in Appendix 2 and the correlation matrix 
displayed in Appendix 3. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The first step in the empirical strategy consists of reducing the dimensions of the KE 
indicators with principal component analysis (PCA) discussed in Section 4.1 below. The KE gaps 
are then assessed by means of sigma and absolute beta convergence strategies. Based on the latter 
estimations, we provide rates of catch-up and timelines for complete (full) catch-up. The former 
enables us to drive policy syndromes based on which catch-up strategies are recommended. But 
before we dive into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to justify the choice of the estimation 
strategies. 
Borrowing from Asongu (2014a), there are substantial differences in ways in which 
convergence can be studied. Notably, convergence across economies versus (vs) convergence 
within an economy; convergence in terms of income vs. convergence in terms of economic 
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growth; TFP (total factor productivity) convergence vs. income convergence; stochastic 
convergence vs. deterministic convergence; sigma convergence vs. beta convergence; local or 
club-convergence vs. global convergence; absolute (unconditional) vs. conditional convergence 
(Islam, 2003). 
There is some nexus between the highlighted definitions of convergence and the 
corresponding methodologies employed. This correspondence is not particularly unique since 
some have all employed beta convergence either conditionally or unconditionally (panel, time 
series,  cross-sectional,  informal  &  formal  approaches).  Most  of  the  approaches  have  been 
oriented towards cross-economy per capita income convergence. In addition, the formal panel 
and cross-sectional approaches have been employed to investigate TFP and club convergence. 
The time series strategy has also been employed to assess both across- and within-economy 
convergence. The cross-sectional strategy has been used for sigma-convergence whereas the 
distribution measurement has been employed beyond the former and has assessed the whole 
shape of distribution and intra-distribution dynamics. 
The basic premise of income convergence is based on the assumption of decreasing 
returns which represent higher marginal productivity in capital-poor nations. Consistent with this 
narrative, poor countries would grow faster and a negative nexus between the subsequent growth 
rate and the initial income levels reflect the scenario. This form of convergence is beta 
convergence. However, as a draw-back of this approach, a negative beta from the initial growth 
levels is not necessarily synonymous to a reduction in dispersion (Young et al., 2008 p. 1091). 
This shortcoming has given birth to the notion of sigma-convergence which is an assessment of 
cross-sectional  standard  deviations  across  time.  While  absolute  beta  convergence  does  not 
depend on country-specific characteristics, conditional beta convergence is contingent on these 
characteristics. Hence the latter form of beta convergence has two critical shortcomings. On the 
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one hand, the specification is substantially reliant on the conditionality of variables that are 
chosen for the model, which in certain situations may not reflect all the variable s needed for the 
form of convergence to take place. On the other hand, the possibility of multiple equilibria since 
every nation could converge to its own long-term equilibrium or steady state (Asongu, 2014a: 
Monfort, 2008, p. 4-5). In light of the above, the empirical strategies adopted in this paper are 
absolute beta convergence and sigma convergence. The absolute beta approach is based on yearly 
averages and means of fundamental characteristics for two reasons: enable comparison with 
sigma convergence and avoid misspecification in catch-up among frontier countries. The latter 
point is very important because without usage of fundamental characteristics’ means, the 
convergence could be among frontier countries within a given homogenous panel and not with 
the core South Korean country. Hence, the empirical strategy may not calibrate the problem 
statement. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 
Consistent with Asongu (2013eh, 2014ef), constituent components of the World Bank’s 
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) may be correlated with each other. Hence, due to the high 
degree of substitution among the constituent components, some information is redundant. We 
tackle the issue by using principal component analysis (PCA) in order to reduce the dimensions 
of the variables into a single indicator for each component. The PCA is a widely employed 
empirical strategy that consists of reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set 
of uncorrelated indicators called principal components (PCs) that represent a significant variation 
in or information from the initial set of indicators. The criterion employed to retain a common 
factor is consistent with Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) who have recommended stopping at 
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factors with an eigenvalue greater than the mean (or one). This eigenvalue corresponds to the 
eigenvector that represents a significant proportion of the initial information. 
Table 1 below shows PCA in KE components for African frontier countries (Panel A) and 
the South Korean core country (Panel B). PCAs are needed for both frontier and core countries to 
illustrate  that  based  on  the  eigenvalues  (reflecting  the  vectors),  the  KE  dimensions  are 
comparable. In Panel A for instance, ICTex which is the first PC for ICT represents about 73% of 
information in constituent elements (internet, mobile & telephone) and has an eigenvalue  of 
above one (2.190). This is comparable with a corresponding 80% in Panel B. 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for KE Indicators   
 
Panel A: PCA for Frontier countries (Africa) 
Knowledge Economy Component Matrix (Loadings) First Eigen Indexes 
  dimensions  PC  Value   
 
Education School PSE SSE TSE  
 Enrolment 0.438 0.657 0.614 0.658 1.975 Educatex 
Information & ICTs Internet Mobile Telephone    
Infrastructure  0.614 0.584 0.531 0.730 2.190 ICTex 
Innovation Innovation STJA Trademarks Patents    
System  0.567 0.572 0.592 0.917 2.753 Innovex 
Economic Economic Private Credit In terest rate Spread    
Incentive Incentive -0.707  0.707 0.656 1.313 Creditex 
& 
Institutional 
regime 
Institutional 
index 
     VA  PS  RQ  GE  RL  CC   
0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 4.642 Instireg 
 
 
 
 
Knowledge Economy 
Panel B: PCA for the Core country (South Korea) 
Component Matrix (Loadings) First 
 
 
Eigen 
 
 
Indexes 
  dimensions  PC  Value   
 
Education School PSE SSE TSE  
 Enrolment -0.359 -0.675 0.645 0.688 2.065 Educatex 
Information & ICTs Internet Mobile Telephone    
Infrastructure  0.612 0.625 0.484 0.800 2.400 ICTex 
Innovation Innovation STJA Trademarks Patents    
System  0.576 0.573 0.582 0.946 2.839 Innovex 
Economic Economic Private Credit In terest rate Spread    
Incentive Incentive 0.707  0.707 0.682 1.365 Creditex 
& 
Institutional 
regime 
Institutional 
index 
     VA  PS  RQ  GE  RL  CC   
0.453 -0.064 0.487 0.460 0.458 0.364 0.664 3.985 Instireg 
 
P.C: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. PC: Principal 
Component. ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary 
school enrolments. ICTex: first principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal 
Articles. Innovex: first principal component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule 
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of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional 
regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Creditex: First PC of Private domestic Credit and Interest rate spread. 
 
 
 
4.2 Knowledge Economy Gaps 
 
4.2.1 Absolute Beta Convergence 
 
4.2.2.1 Catch-up specification 
 
The two equations below are the standard procedures for estimating convergence (Fung, 
 
2009). 
 
ln(Yi,t ) − ln(Yi,t −τ ) = β ln(Yi,t −τ ) + δWi,t −τ  +ηi + ξt + ε i,t 
 
 
ln(Yi,t ) = a ln(Yi,t −τ ) + δWi ,t −τ  + ηi  + ξt  + ε i,t 
(1) 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
Where a = 1+ β, Yi ,t is the measure of a KE dimension in country i at period t. Wi ,t is a vector of 
 
 
determinants of KE, ηi   is a country-specific effect, ξt   is a time-specific constant and ε i ,t   an 
 
error term. In line with the exogenous growth theory, a statistically negative coefficient  of β  in 
Eq. (1) suggests that countries comparatively close to their equilibrium or steady-state in KE will 
experience a slowdown in KE, known as beta convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2773).  In the 
 
same vein, consistent with Fung (2009,  p. 59), if 0 < a < 1in Eq. (2), then Yi ,t is stable 
 
 
dynamically around the   path with a growth rate in trend the same as that of Wt , and with a 
 
corresponding height relative to the level of Wt (Asongu, 2014a).  The proxies contained in Wi ,t −τ 
 
 
and the individual-effect ηi measure for the long-run level KE is converging to. Accordingly, the 
 
country-specific effect ηi measures other determinants of a country’s equilibrium not captured by 
 
Wi ,t −τ . For convergence to take place Wi ,t must be strictly exogenous. Unfortunately, it is not 
 
always the case and a means of correcting the problem between some potential correlation 
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between the lagged endogenous variables and the individual-specific effect involves eliminating 
the latter by first differencing. 
Hence, Eq. (2) becomes: 
 
ln(Yi,t ) − ln(Yi,t −τ ) = a(ln(Yi,t −τ ) − ln(Yi,t −2τ )) + δ (Wi,t −τ  − Wi,t −2τ ) + (ξt  − ξt −τ ) + (ε i,t  − ε i,t −τ ) (3) 
 
A means of further dealing with the correlation between the lagged endogenous variable 
and the error term consists of regressing the equations in levels jointly with the equations in first 
difference in order to exploit all the orthogonality conditions. The process uses lagged differences 
of the regressors as instruments in the levels equation and lagged levels of the regressors as 
instruments in the difference equation. Consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. pp. 3-4)3, we prefer 
the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) to the difference 
GMM specification (Arellano & Bond, 1991). A two-step procedure is also preferred to a one- 
step specification because it accounts for heteroscedasticity. 
Since yearly intervals are not appropriate for investigating catch-up because short-run 
disturbances may loom  substantially large,  we  use  3  year  non-overlapping  intervals  (NOI). 
Hence, τ is set to 3. Therefore in order to compute the implied catch-up rate, we calculate ‘a/3’ or 
‘1+β/3’ because we have used 3 NOI to mitigate short-run disturbances. For convergence to take 
 
place, the following information criterion is needed: 0 < a < 1 or β<0. We choose the former to 
 
avoid too much arithmetic gymnastics4. With the absolute value of the lagged coefficient less 
 
 
 
3  “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to 
perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with 
standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. 
Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research”. Bond 
et al. (2001, pp. 3-4). 
4 To put our point into perspective, consistent with Asongu (2014a)  the estimated lagged value of a standard 
dynamic GMM approach is a from which 1 is subtracted to obtain β (β= a-1). Under this scenario, the information 
criterion for beta-convergence is β < 0 . Hence, in order to limit the arithmetical gymnastics, a could be reported 
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than one but greater than zero ( 0 < a < 1), the existence of catch-up can be confirmed. A general 
interpretation consistent with the neoclassical growth model is as follows: past variations have a 
less proportionate  incidence  on  future variations.  Hence  with  the  left  hand  side  of  Eq.  (3) 
 
decreasing with time, the country is approaching equilibrium or  a steady-state. The Sargan over- 
identifying restrictions (OIR) test and second-order Arellano & Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test 
are used to assess the validity of the instruments and absence of autocorrelation in the residuals 
respectively. 
 
4.2.2.2 Presentation of absolute beta catch-up results 
 
Three main issues are assessed in this section: (1) the presence of catch-up; (2) the speed 
of catch-up and; (3) the time required for full catch-up. Table 2 below summarizes the findings of 
Table 3. Owing to the shortcomings discussed in the methodology section on conditional beta 
catch-up, we only model absolute beta catch-up. Hence, absolute (or unconditional) convergence 
has been estimated with only the lagged difference of the dependent variable as independent 
variable. In other words, absolute catch-up is modeled without Wi ,t . 
To investigate the validity of the estimation and indeed the catch-up hypothesis, two tests 
have been performed to validate the models: the Sargan OIR and AR(2) tests. The latter assesses 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals whereas the former investigates the null 
hypothesis for the absence of correlation between the error terms and the residuals.   Hence, 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests is essential for the validity of the models. Based 
on the findings presented in Table 3, the null of both tests are overwhelmingly rejected. 
 
 
 
 
and the 0 < a < 1information criterion used to determine convergence. This is interpretation is in line with recent 
convergence literature (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23; Asongu, 
2013a, 2014a). 
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Before discussing the results, we devote some space to elucidating how the numbers in 
Table 2 have been obtained.   For an estimated initial value of 0.49 that is consistent with the 
information criterion ( 0 < a < 1), the rate of catch-up is 16.33% per annum (0.49/3) and the 
period needed to achieve full or 100% catch-up is 18.37 years (300%/16.33%). 
 
In the summary of the results presented in Table 1 below, the following could be 
established between African frontier countries and the South Korean core country. First, with the 
exception of ICT where no catch-up is apparent, in increasing order it is visible in: innovation, 
economic  incentives,  education  and  institutional  regime.   Second,  the  essence  of  using 
fundamental characteristics is sound, since there is evidence of wealth-effects, legal-origin 
effects…etc, in KE catch-up patterns (e.g Education). The speed of convergence varies between 
8.66% per annum (Nonoil in Economic incentive dimension) and 30.00% (Innovation dimension) 
 
with respective time to full or 100% convergence of 34.64 years and 10 years. 
 
  Table 2: Summary of results   
 
Panel A: Education (Educatex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
 Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  
Catch-up(C) Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of C (%) 16.33 --- 18.33 --- --- 15.00 12.00 16.66 14.33 16.33 14.66 --- 17.83 
Time to FC (Yrs) 18.37 --- 16.36 --- --- 20.00 25.00 18.00 20.93 18.37 20.46 --- 16.82 
 
Panel B: Information & Communication Technology (ICTex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
 Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  
Catch-up(C) No No No No No No No No No No No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Panel C: Innovation (Innovex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
 Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  
Catch-up(C) No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- --- --- 30.00 --- 30.00 --- 29.33 --- --- --- --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- --- --- 10.00 --- 10.00 --- 10.22 --- --- --- --- 
 
Panel D: Institutional Regime (Instireg) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
 Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  
Catch-up(C) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rate of C (%) 15.33 16.66 15.00 15.66 11.66 13.66 16.33 17.00 18.00 16.33 17.33 17.33 13.00 
Time to FC (Yrs) 19.56 18.00 20.00 19.15 25.72 21.96 18.37 17.64 16.66 18.37 17.31 17.31 23.07 
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Panel E: Economic Incentives (Creditex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
 Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  
Catch-up(C) No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Rate of C (%) --- --- --- 12.00 --- 8.66 19.00 14.66 17.00 --- 12.66 20.00 --- 
Time to FC (Yrs) --- --- --- 25.00 --- 34.64 15.78 20.46 17.64 --- 23.69 15.00 --- 
Low: Low Income countries. Middle: Middle Income countries. English: English Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: 
Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. Closed:   Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. 
Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. C: Catch-up. FC: 
Full Catch-up. Yrs: Years. 
 
  Table 3: Dynamic System GMM   
 
Panel A: Education (Educatex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA 
Initial 0.49*** -0.164 0.55*** 0.688 0.530 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.44*** -6.575 0.53** 
 (0.001) (0.876) (0.003) (0.240) (0.608) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.022) 
AR(2) (0.745) (0.837) (0.330) (0.228) (0.480) (0.177) (0.307) (0.281) (0.303) (0.252) (0.229) n.a (0.418) 
Sargan (0.996) (0.995) (0.992) (0.988) (0.987) (0.998) (0.999) (0.992) (0.999) (0.993) (0.995) (1.000) (0.990) 
Wald 10.2*** 0.024 8.48*** 1.377 0.262 120*** 72.3*** 23.0*** 31.8*** 24.1*** 59.0*** 2.300 5.23** 
 (0.001) (0.876) (0.003) (0.240) (0.608) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.129) (0.022) 
 
Panel B: Information & Communication Technology (ICTex) 
 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  Initial 0.536 0.973 0.797 0.668 0.743 0.686 0.522 0.785 0.549 0.763 0.619 1.227 0.736 
 (0.166) (0.448) (0.244) (0.295) (0.444) (0.175) (0.128) (0.337) (0.183) (0.277) (0.129) (0.493) (0.487) 
AR(2) (0.356) (0.337) (0.342) (0.360) (0.353) (0.356) (0.354) (0.351) (0.359) (0.348) (0.358) (0.312) (0.301) 
Sargan (0.981) (0.982) (0.988) (0.988) (0.963) (0.978) (0.982) (0.986) (0.980) (0.972) (0.981) (0.982) (0.965) 
Wald 1.914 0.575 1.357 1.092 0.584 1.838 2.313 0.921 1.766 1.177 2.299 0.468 0.483 
 (0.166) (0.448) (0.244) (0.295) (0.444) (0.175) (0.128) (0.337) (0.183) (0.277) (0.129) (0.493) (0.487) 
 
Panel C: Innovation (Innovex) 
 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  Initial 0.064 0.193 1.22*** 0.302 0.90*** -0.162 0.90*** 0.338 0.88*** 0.318 0.319 0.211 2.845 
 (0.540) (0.902) (0.000) (0.551) (0.000) (0.885) (0.000) (0.708) (0.000) (0.736) (0.747) (0.867) (0.564) 
AR(2) (0.412) (0.903) (0.300) (0.603) (0.306) (0.640) (0.293) (0.816) (0.313) (0.878) (0.886) (0.933) (0.597) 
Sargan (0.998) (0.994) (0.992) (0.994) (0.985) (0.999) (0.985) (0.996) (0.985) (0.997) (0.991) (0.996) (0.995) 
Wald 0.374 0.014 48.7*** 0.354 1503*** 0.020 322*** 0.140 10797*** 0.113 0.103 0.027 0.332 
 (0.540) (0.902) (0.000) (0.551) (0.000) (0.885) (0.000) (0.708) (0.000) (0.736) (0.747) (0.867) (0.564) 
 
Panel D: Institutional Regime (Instireg) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA 
Initial 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.47*** 0.35* 0.41*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.39*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
AR(2) (0.355) (0.254) (0.349) (0.330) (0.497) (0.413) (0.341) (0.291) (0.259) (0.296) (0.279) (0.281) (0.413) 
Sargan (0.998) (0.998) (0.998) (0.994) (0.992) (0.994) (0.998) (0.994) (0.993) (0.994) (0.998) (0.998) (0.998) 
Wald 92.9*** 25.7*** 110*** 514*** 3.46* 12.03*** 569*** 149*** 7.05*** 243*** 63.0*** 20.6*** 9.19*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
 
Panel E: Economic Incentives (Creditex) 
Income Levels Legal Origins Petroleum Openness to sea Stability Regions Africa 
Low Middle English French Oil NoOil Closed Open Conf NoConf SSA NA  Initial -2.2*** -0.47 -0.054 0.36*** 0.756 0.26* 0.57*** 0.44*** 0.51*** 0.128 0.38* 0.60*** -0.928 
 (0.005) (0.649) (0.902) (0.000) (0.514) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.707) (0.065) (0.000) (0.384) 
AR(2) (0.573) (0.512) (0.386) (0.312) (0.243) (0.339) (0.312) (0.261) (0.294) (0.367) (0.292) (0.304) (0.549) 
Sargan (0.995) (0.999) (0.999) (0.998) (0.989) (0.996) (0.998) (0.989) (0.992) (0.997) (0.997) (0.993) (1.000) 
Wald 7.82*** 0.206 0.015 80.1*** 0.424 2.87* 128*** 7.14*** 7.92*** 0.140 3.384* 20.9*** 0.755 
 (0.005) (0.649) (0.902) (0.000) (0.514) (0.089) (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.707) (0.065) (0.000) (0.384) 
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*,**,**: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.   AR(2): Second-order Autocorrelation test. 
Sargan: Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets. Low: Low Income countries. Middle: Middle Income countries. English: English 
Common law countries. French: French Civil law countries. Oil: Petroleum Exporting countries. NoOil: Non-petroleum Exporting countries. 
Closed: Landlocked countries. Open: Countries open to the sea. Conf: Conflict Affected countries. NoConf: Countries not Affected by Conflicts. 
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. 
 
We have already seen in the methodology section that beta convergence is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for sigma convergence. Hence, beta convergence is generally 
appreciated as catch-up whereas; sigma convergence is a reduction in cross-country dispersions 
necessary for convergence to really take place. To this end, we complement the absolute beta 
catch-up estimations above with tabular and graphical sigma convergence patterns for robustness 
purposes and greater subtlety in the analysis. 
 
4.2.2 Sigma convergence: tabular and graphical of KE dispersions 
 
Table 4 below is a tabular representation of KE convergence between frontier African 
countries and the core South Korean country in terms of education (Panel A), ICT (Panel B), 
innovation (Panel C), institutional regime (Panel D) and economic incent ives (Panel E). The 
sigma convergence approach consists of computing standard deviations across time between the 
frontier fundamental characteristics and South Korea. 
  Table 4: Tabular representation of KE dispersions   
Panel A: Education (Educatex) 
 
Years 
1996 
Low.I 
1.279 
Mid.I 
2.670 
Eng. 
2.134 
Frch. 
1.462 
Oil 
1.886 
NOil 
1.689 
LL 
1.626 
NLL 
1.782 
Con 
1.536 
NCon 
1.739 
SSA 
1.523 
NA 
2.540 
Africa 
1.714 
1997 0.567 2.469 1.900 1.289 0.468 1.653 0.593 1.826 0.573 1.653 1.215 2.429 1.518 
1998 0.289 1.377 1.136 0.668 0.086 0.968 0.129 1.094 -1.563 0.968 0.492 1.333 0.772 
1999 0.023 1.052 0.734 0.375 0.637 0.470 0.334 0.562 0.268 0.546 0.296 1.634 0.495 
2000 0.483 0.379 0.390 0.438 0.370 0.078 0.341 0.009 0.254 0.111 0.222 0.994 0.132 
2001 1.250 0.157 0.169 0.916 1.021 0.569 0.914 0.358 1.526 0.519 0.706 0.003 0.610 
2002 1.272 0.373 0.437 0.522 1.045 0.715 0.965 0.230 --- 0.485 0.803 0.660 0.485 
2003 1.139 0.406 0.277 0.508 0.243 0.605 0.994 0.092 1.076 0.373 0.797 1.043 0.441 
2004 1.078 0.287 0.308 0.636 0.331 0.577 0.931 0.326 1.026 0.484 0.797 0.632 0.542 
2005 1.055 0.118 0.290 0.734 0.330 0.625 0.996 0.349 0.873 0.536 0.745 0.444 0.586 
2006 1.099 0.067 0.362 0.822 0.856 0.661 1.014 0.422 1.205 0.646 0.776 0.080 0.669 
2007 1.029 0.409 0.078 0.758 --- 0.650 1.202 0.329 1.023 0.606 0.803 0.162 0.160 
2008 0.995 0.461 0.078 0.712 0.867 0.582 1.138 0.138 1.099 0.482 0.722 0.319 0.612 
2009 0.881 0.812 0.277 0.511 0.134 0.580 0.993 0.091 0.938 0.369 0.702 0.870 0.478 
2010 0.818 0.072 0.414 0.548 0.428 0.566 0.755 0.263 0.686 0.491 0.525 0.766 0.540 
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Panel B: Information and Communication Technology (ICTex) 
 
Years 
1996 
Low.I 
1.488 
Mid.I 
1.804 
Eng. 
1.714 
Frch. 
1.542 
Oil 
1.559 
NOil 
1.625 
LL 
1.514 
NLL 
1.661 
Con 
1.484 
NCon 
1.657 
SSA 
1.598 
NA 
1.787 
Africa 
1.616 
1997 1.236 1.577 1.478 1.302 0.595 1.388 1.262 1.420 1.230 1.417 1.358 1.500 1.372 
1998 1.035 1.422 1.318 1.112 1.088 1.213 1.067 1.241 -1.697 1.240 1.176 1.329 1.191 
1999 0.309 0.167 0.034 0.200 0.195 0.093 0.263 0.052 0.315 0.052 0.138 0.097 0.112 
2000 0.714 0.130 0.309 0.570 0.572 0.448 0.653 0.400 0.723 0.398 0.502 0.235 0.472 
2001 0.898 0.216 0.430 0.727 0.747 0.584 0.830 0.530 0.914 0.527 0.651 0.328 0.615 
2002 0.980 0.219 0.469 0.782 0.790 0.634 0.909 0.567 0.991 0.568 0.711 0.290 0.664 
2003 0.950 0.114 0.353 0.736 0.749 0.560 0.884 0.480 0.954 0.500 0.654 0.154 0.596 
2004 0.850 0.158 0.129 0.571 0.563 0.379 0.788 0.260 0.845 0.310 0.502 0.238 0.415 
2005 0.879 0.289 0.094 0.529 0.446 0.358 0.830 0.186 0.468 0.254 0.502 0.577 0.375 
2006 0.647 0.682 0.259 0.230 0.054 0.049 0.608 0.173 0.604 0.092 0.209 1.088 0.050 
2007 0.741 0.754 0.155 0.288 0.046 0.138 0.704 0.110 0.729 0.057 0.298 1.272 0.642 
2008 0.805 0.918 0.160 0.241 0.034 0.119 0.770 0.179 0.779 0.112 0.310 1.636 0.090 
2009 1.070 0.709 0.282 0.402 0.035 0.430 1.024 0.073 1.036 0.167 0.642 1.722 0.359 
2010 1.101 0.928 0.199 0.479 0.027 0.297 1.106 0.119 1.019 0.080 0.536 1.856 0.249 
Panel C: Innovation (Innovex) 
Years Low.I Mid.I Eng. Frch. Oil NOil LL NLL Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1996 1.010 2.321 1.974 1.518 1.407 1.757 1.023 2.126 1.056 1.874 1.678 1.808 1.725 
1997 0.950 2.629 2.166 1.036 1.020 1.897 0.862 1.975  1.789 1.897 1.249 1.789 
1998 1.569 3.107 2.849 2.212 1.888 2.622 1.456 2.684  2.530 2.567 2.469 2.530 
1999 0.927 2.482 2.028 1.381 1.073 1.915 0.803 1.834 0.910 1.818 1.646 1.881 1.705 
2000 0.100 1.832 1.638 0.678 0.380 1.373 0.111 1.481 0.206 1.237 1.024 1.252 1.090 
2001 0.005 1.842 1.675 1.174 0.283 2.269 0.005 1.842 0.077 1.824 1.675 1.174 1.475 
2002 0.048 1.815 1.757 0.534 0.297 1.362 0.015 1.237 0.167 1.206 1.029 1.130 1.058 
2003 0.258 1.501 1.394 0.262 0.053 1.067 0.349 0.929 0.267 0.916 0.691 0.888 0.747 
2004 0.682 0.963 1.076 0.092 0.416 0.600 0.757 0.503 0.664 0.490 0.332 0.369 0.346 
2005 1.150 0.662 0.756 0.482 0.815 0.248 1.253 0.159 0.895 0.136 0.053 0.041 0.018 
2006 1.426 0.534 0.695 1.056 1.031 0.016 1.521 0.103 1.345 0.133 0.201 0.568 0.306 
2007 1.706 0.391 0.596 1.110 1.399 0.296 1.769 0.388 1.633 0.405 0.601 0.421 0.748 
2008 1.715 0.586 0.337 0.699  0.181  0.181  0.181 0.231 0.082 0.181 
2009 1.654 1.346 1.262 0.598  0.146  0.146  0.146 0.217 0.039 0.146 
2010              
Panel D: Institutional Regime (Instireg) 
Years Low.I Mid.I Eng. Frch. Oil NOil LL NLL Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1996 1.570 2.279 2.269 1.609 0.464 2.267 2.337 1.729 0.180 2.273 1.843 2.097 1.877 
1997              
1998 2.332 3.575 3.474 2.501 1.540 3.123 2.810 2.858 -3.127 3.249 2.808 3.117 2.844 
1999              
2000 1.131 2.295 2.091 1.347 0.366 1.876 1.508 1.652 0.286 2.072 1.564 1.955 1.610 
2001              
2002 1.041 0.070 0.152 0.819 1.648 0.355 0.794 0.496 2.369 0.148 0.642 0.140 0.583 
2003 0.380 0.689 0.548 0.206 0.953 0.277 0.114 0.133 1.816 0.518 0.002 0.523 0.060 
2004 0.660 0.359 0.288 0.528 1.255 0.023 0.368 0.187 2.087 0.210 0.307 0.257 0.240 
2005 1.721 0.693 0.728 1.608 2.352 1.072 1.401 1.254 1.458 0.862 1.359 0.836 1.298 
2006 0.057 0.943 1.020 0.009 0.755 0.592 0.261 0.393 1.302 0.759 0.319 0.624 0.355 
2007 1.799 0.803 0.723 1.752 2.528 1.144 1.477 1.352 3.063 0.980 1.431 1.067 0.017 
2008 0.141 0.923 0.972 0.071 0.846 0.542 0.244 0.319 1.411 0.714 0.267 0.522 0.297 
2009 1.533 0.485 0.421 1.472 2.205 0.865 1.149 1.081 2.679 0.716 1.128 0.901 1.101 
2010 1.905 0.993 0.804 1.925 2.692 1.280 1.491 1.545 3.029 1.164 1.528 1.539 1.529 
 
Panel E: Economic Incentives (Creditex) 
 
Years Low.I Mid.I Eng. Frch. Oil NOil LL NLL Con NCon SSA NA Africa 
1996 1.366 1.028 1.022 1.372 1.511 1.085 1.241 1.183 1.637 1.112 1.226 1.000 1.203 
1997 1.530 1.160 1.246 1.444 0.767 1.252 1.502 1.262 1.626 1.278 1.366 1.189 1.345 
1998 0.372 0.067 0.070 0.224 0.405 0.068 0.343 0.062 0.091 0.088 0.195 0.107 0.152 
1999 0.907 0.507 0.607 0.794 1.043 0.585 0.872 0.625 1.140 0.621 0.753 0.406 0.707 
   2000  1.831     1.467     1.544     1.741     2.064     1.498     1.806     1.570  2.180  1.543  1.703  1.297  1.649   
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2001 0.192 0.610 0.496 0.317 0.039 0.533 0.205 0.499 0.055 0.492 0.346 0.760 0.401 
2002 0.247 0.661 0.541 0.394 0.173 0.578 0.252 0.559 0.013 0.546 0.397 0.791 0.460 
2003 0.438 0.810 0.740 0.539 0.305 0.763 0.438 0.721 0.130 0.726 0.567 0.954 0.630 
2004 0.393 0.811 0.747 0.501 0.271 0.764 0.416 0.716 0.125 0.714 0.562 0.966 0.616 
2005 0.303 0.786 0.681 0.434 0.188 0.692 0.342 0.664 0.457 0.655 0.506 0.849 0.553 
2006 0.053 0.571 0.435 0.212 0.036 0.464 0.110 0.431 0.046 0.401 0.317 0.446 0.332 
2007 0.002 0.662 0.529 0.135 0.059 0.444 0.104 0.426 0.084 0.441 0.315 0.522 0.531 
2008 0.155 0.988 0.720 0.349 0.428 0.597 0.282 0.696 0.138 0.680 0.565 0.633 0.572 
2009 1.112 2.025 1.768 1.293 1.517 1.607 1.278 1.705 1.147 1.712 1.594 1.586 1.593 
2010              
Low. I: Low Income countries. Mid. I: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Oil: 
petroleum exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum exporting countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. Con: 
Conflict affected countries. NCon: Non conflict affected countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. S.K: South Korea. 
 
Figures 1-5 below are based on Table 4. As will be discussed in Section 4.3 below, both 
tabular and graphical representations are needed to fully calibrate ‘policy syndromes’ for more 
targeted/focused policy implications/strategies. 
 
Figure 1: Sigma convergence in Education (X-axis for years and Y-axis for Education) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 1 above that the gap between Korea and African countries was 
very substantial in 1996, with Middle-income and Low-income countries witnessing the highest 
and lowest gaps respectively. It should be noted that a decreasing value in the Y-axis depicts a 
more balanced development in KE between the frontier fundamentals and the core country (South 
Korea).  However,  the  gap  decreased  substantially  up  to  the  year  2000  in  all  fundamental 
29  
characteristics.   After   this   period,   it   has   averagely  remained   stable,   though   fluctuating 
considerably in North Africa and Oil exporting countries. A reason for the increase in gap from 
the year 2000 can be explained from the KE strategies Korea adopted in the beginning of the 
millennium. Consistent with Suh & Chen (2007, p. 25), in 2000 Korea embarked on human 
resource development in its transition to intensive KE by greatly improving on education. 
 
Figure 2: Sigma convergence in ICT (X-axis for years and Y-axis for ICT) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 depicts the dispersions in ICT. The trends can be broadly summarized in three 
phases. A first phase between 1996 and 1999 entailing sharp declines in the dispersions. A 
second phase of gradual improvement and slow decline from 1999 to 2005, with a peak in 2002. 
A third of phase of increases in the dispersions with mixed tendencies: sharp (North Africa, 
Conflicts, Low-income, Landlocked) and gradual (Nonconflicts, Oil-exporting, Notlandlocked). 
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Figure 3: Sigma convergence in Innovation (X-axis for years and Y-axis for Innovation) 
 
 
Dynamics in the dispersions of innovation depicted in Figure 3 above generally display an 
oscillating pattern. First, a steep decline from 1996 to 1997, then a sharp rise between 1997 and 
1998,  followed  by another  steep  decline  to  the  year  2000,  after  which  two  tendencies  are 
observed: a first with some countries leveling-up for two years before witnessing a another sharp 
rise to 2011 (Oil exporting, Conflicts, Low-income, Landlocked) and; a second category of 
countries broadly experiencing sharp rises and decreases between 2000 and 2002 before 
displaying wave-like reductions in the dispersions. 
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Figure 4: Sigma convergence in Institutional Regime (X-axis for years and Y-axis for 
Institutional Regime) 
 
 
 
 
Patterns of dispersions in institutional regime shown in Figure 4 above are almost uniform 
across fundamental characteristics. The breaks in 1997, 1999 and 2001 are due to missing data. 
Generally there are approximately eight wave-like patterns (or increases and reductions) in the 
dispersions. The last phase of these oscillations depicts a sharp increase in the dispersions: 
signaling a growing gap in the institutional  dimension of KE between the core country and 
frontier African countries. 
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Figure 5: Sigma convergence in Economic Incentives (X-axis for years and Y-axis for 
Economic Incentives) 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 5 above, the tendencies observed in economic incentive dispersions are broadly 
similar across fundamental characteristics. However, while the magnitude in elimination of 
dispersions are almost indistinguishable in the first (1996 to 2001) and third (2008 to 2008) 
phases, the second phase (2001 to 2008) is characterized by the following dispersion magnitudes, 
in increasing order: conflict, oil-exporting, landlocked, low-income, French civil law, Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Nonconflicts, English common law, Africa,  Middle-income and North Africa. 
One common factor in Figures 1-5 is an increasing gap in KE after the year 2000: an 
indication that compelling catch-up strategies are required to mitigate the growing gaps. In fact 
the growing gaps are consistent with the Anyanwu (2012) finding that the African KEI has 
decreased between the years 2000 and 2009. 
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4.3. Policy syndromes and Catch-up strategies 
 
4.3.1 Policy syndromes 
 
Fosu  (2013c)  defines  policy syndromes as situations that  are  detrimental  to  growth: 
 
‘administered redistribution’, ‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal 
resource allocation’ with the absence of syndromes qualified as ‘syndrome-free’. The syndromes 
are thought to have substantially contributed to the poor post-independence growth of Africa.  In 
the context of this paper, policy syndromes are negative tendencies of dispersions in KE 
dimensions between African frontier countries and the core South Korean economy. Hence, 
increasing deviations for a given KE dimension denotes ‘policy syndromes’ (PS) whereas a trend 
portraying diminishing dispersions is qualified as a ‘syndrome-free’ (SF) tendency. While catch- 
up strategies discussed in this section are more relevant in PS scenarios, enhancing existing 
policies in SF events are essential to ensure a complete elimination of dispersions. This is 
essentially because SF situations are prone to become PS scenario given the history of wave -like 
trends in the KE dispersion patterns. Therefore, the catch-up strategies are essential both for 
preventing and curing dispersions in SF and PS scenarios respectively. Hence, we devote space to 
specifically detailing the PS before discussing the catch-up strategies. 
As we have already discussed in Section 4.2.2 above, both tabular and graphical 
representations are needed to fully calibrate PS for more targeted/focused policy 
implications/strategies. Hence Table 5 below depicting comparative PS and SF scenarios is 
obtained from both representations. While the left-hand-side of the table shows PS (or high 
dispersion panels), the right-hand-side presents SF (or low dispersion panels).  Based on the 
patterns, it is consistently observed for the first-three dimensions of KE that ‘landlockedness’, 
‘low income’ and ‘political instability’  are high PS fundamental characteristics. We discuss 
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catch-up strategies relevant to the fundamental characteristics and degree of PS in the following 
section. 
 
  Tabl e  5:  ‘P ol i c y  Sy ndr ome ’  an d  ‘ Sy ndr ome  F r e e ’  Infor mati on  Cr i te r i a   
 
Policy Syndrome (PS)   ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   Syndrome Free (SF) 
 
Educatex Low.I LL NA Con Frch. NOil Africa SSA NCon Oil Eng. NLL Mid. I 
ICTex NA Low.I LL Con Mid. I SSA Frch Africa NOil Eng NLL NCon Oil 
Innovex LL Low. I Con Oil Mid. I Eng Frch SSA NOil Africa NCon NLL NA 
Instireg Con Oil Low. I Frch. NA SSA Africa LL NOil NLL NCon Mid.I Eng 
Creditex Mid. I Eng NCon NLL NOil SSA Africa NA Oil Frch LL Con Low.I 
 
Highest Dispersions  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   Lowest Dispersions 
 
Low. I: Low Income countries. Mid. I: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. O il: 
petroleum exporting countries. NOil: Non-petroleum exporting countries. LL: Landlocked countries. NLL: Not Landlocked countries. Con: 
Conflict affected countries. NCon: Non conflict affected countries. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. NA: North Africa. S.K: South Korea. P.C: Principal 
Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. ICTs: Information and 
Communication Technologies. Educatex is the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first 
principal component of mobile, telephone and internet subscriptions. STJA: Scientific and Technical Journal Articles. Innovex: first principal 
component of STJA, trademarks and patents (resident plus nonresident). VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. 
GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional regime): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, 
RL & CC. Creditex: First PC of Private domestic Credit and Interest rate spread. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Catch-up strategies 
 
The interesting questions motivating this section of whether other countries can adapt to 
the Korean model and catch-up have already been answered by Lee (2009) in the affirmative. 
Hence, consistent with Suh & Chen (2007), there are two important lessons from the experiences 
of Korea. First, human capital is essential for the development of science & technology and 
economic prosperity. Second, market competition is the greatest motivator of privates business to 
engage  in  technology  development.  Thus  it  is  important  to  consolidate  the  capabilities  of 
scientific research and ameliorate conditions for innovation. 
 
4.3.2.1 Education and Innovation strategies 
 
The lack of investment in education and brain drain have been recently documented as 
some of the issues standing on the way to consolidating the educational pillar of KE in Africa 
(Kamara et al., 2007; Ford, 2007; Amavilah, 2009; Chavula, 2010; Weber, 2011; Anyanwu, 
35  
2012; Asongu, 2013fg; Andres et al., 2014; Asongu, 2014j). There is a background of depleting 
knowledge infrastructure, limited support for R&D, brain-drain, limited direct nexuses between 
science & industry and outdated curricula. The continent is on a downward trend in KE 
(Anyanwu, 2012) and risk losing the new economy unless bold measures are implemented to 
reinvigorate science & technology, innovation and higher education (Kamara, 2007). We have 
established Africa’s deficiency in innovation in Section 2 (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka & Gehl Sampath, 
2007; Anyanwu, 2012; Carisle et al., 2013; Asongu, 2013eh). What lessons does South Korea 
hold for the above issues? 
First, African economies should take bold steps towards increasing college enrolment and 
the ratio of R&D/GDP. As shown by Lee (2009), such measures are effective and possible only 
in conjunction with substantial improvements in other institutional and policy environments, 
including the capacity and autonomy of government. Education consolidates a nation’s ability to 
acquire new technology and knowledge. It also gives birth to the tacit knowledge of individuals 
which are essential in consolidating blocks of technological learning. In this light, African 
governments have to take full responsibility for the necessary measures needed to promote this 
core human resource development (Suh & Chen, 2007). In essence, while Korea continues to 
import a substantial portion of its technology from more advanced nations, it has developed a 
solid indigenous R&D platform and allocates about 3% of its GDP to R&D. Essentially, these 
strategies for technology and education best illustrate the disciplinary and practical dimensions 
that should motivate African countries in their efforts towards KE. 
Second, in order for workers to cope with changing technological conditions, African 
governments need to provide technical and vocational trainings as well as take the necessary 
steps to encourage trainings at work places. The intuition behind this strategy is that as a nation 
becomes  more  advanced,  a  critical  factor  that  comes  with  the  prosperity  is  technological 
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competence. For these strategies to be implemented, African government policy makers should 
nurture engineers and high-caliber scientists that are capable of handling prosperity on the 
frontiers of science & technology. In the Korean experience, industrialization and education 
complemented one another in accelerating and sustaining development. In essence, education 
produced technological learning and industrialization and the latest boosted the return rate on 
educational investment, which further promoted the demand for education (Such & Chen, 2007). 
Third, consistent with the documented literature in the preceding sections (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004), the industrialization of Korea progressed from imitation to innovation. Hence, 
reverse engineering and less stringent property rights are essential to enable the copying of 
technology-intensive  commodities.  Frontier  African  countries  should  therefore  engage  in 
informal channels of technology transfer at the initial stages of their industrialization. As 
documented by Suh & Chen (2007), the nexus between education and human development needs 
to be tailored into a lifelong learning strategy. 
Based on the ‘policy syndromes’, the increasing relevance of the strategies is as follows: 
(1) Middle-income, Not Landlocked, English Common law, Oil-exporting, Nonconflict, SSA, 
Africa, Non-Oil exporting,  French Civil law, Conflict-affected, North Africa,  Landlocked & 
Low-income countries for the educational dimension and; (2) North Africa, Not Landlocked 
Nonconflict, Africa, Non-Oil exporting, SSA, French Civil law, English Common law, Middle 
Income,  Oil  exporting,  Conflict-affected,  Low  income  &     Landlocked  countries  for  the 
innovation dimension of KE. 
 
4.3.2.2 ICT catch-up strategies 
 
The plethora of Africa benefits in ICT catch-up has already been substantially covered in 
 
Section 2 (African Partnership Forum, 2008; Chavula, 2010; Butcher, 2011). As we have already 
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highlighted in the preceding section, reverse engineering of imported ICTs and less stringent 
IPRs on ICTs would be steps in the right direction towards enhancing the African base in ICTs. 
These would drive down the cost technological acquisition and mitigate the dependence on 
business operations. 
Korea’s  ICT  success  has  hinged  on  the  exercise  of  soundly-integrated  approaches 
entailing an industrial policy, an active informatization policy and competitive & regulatory 
policies that are well enforced. The core country invested massively in internet equipment, 
telephone lines, multimedia, inter alia. These investments have substantially contributed to its 
economic prosperity. Consistent with Such & Chen (2007), the policy was clearly articulated 
along three main areas highlighted in the first sentence of this paragraph, which entailed: R&D, 
venture capital and human resources (an industrial policy); privatization & market liberalization 
(enforced competitive & regulatory policy) and; setting-up of e-government, constructing an 
advanced infrastructure (an active information policy). In essence, combining the three areas of 
policy in a complementary mechanism has been main cause for IT strategy success. Hence it is a 
lesson that could inspire African countries because the well-tailored information infrastructure 
has been the basis for the exceptional development of Korea. In decreasing order, the relevance 
of above strategies applies to: North Africa, Low-income, Landlocked, Conflict-affected, Middle- 
income, SSA, French Civil law, Africa, Non-Oil exporting, English Common law, Not 
Landlocked, Non-conflicts and Oil exporting countries. 
 
4.3.2.3 Institutional regime and Economic incentive catch-up strategies 
 
Good institutions are central to the emergence of African economies (Fosu, 2013d). In 
Section 2, we have seen that African countries are substantially lacking in this fourth pillar of KE 
(Cogburn, 2003; Letiche, 2006). The issues include, inter alia: poor institutions (Andrés et al., 
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2014), especially corruption in upholding IPRs (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a); surplus banking 
liquidity or absence of credit to finance investment needs (Saxegaard, 2006; Nguena & Tsafack, 
2014). 
 
4.3.2.3.1 Institutional regime 
 
Poor institutions and capital flight repugnant to investment and economic prosperity have 
been substantially documented in African development literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 
2001, 2003, 2008, 2011; Fofack & Ndikumana, 2009). African institutions need to be market- 
focused by adopting a development strategy that completely liberates the competitive forces 
essential  for  the  dynamics  of  KE.     A  market-oriented  strategy  requires  the  presence  of 
competitive   forces   and   therefore   enhances   competition.   Hence,   to   fight   capital   flight, 
transparency of financial markets, a leveled playing field for all market participants, government 
accountability, foreign investment regimes and liberalized trade are essential components of the 
KE. 
African governments’ institutions should foster an industrialization strategy that is export- 
led.  Accordingly, by adopting extensive development strategies, they would expose African 
corporations  to  global  competition  like  Korean  industries.  This  would  ultimately  compel 
domestic industries to invest substantially in innovation and technological assimilation in order to 
remain competitive. 
One of the advantages of having a credible institutional regime is drawn from the manner 
in which the Korean government solved the 1997 crisis. The lesson holds some potential for the 
mitigation of capital flight. African governments can learn from the special recognition in the 
long-term fiscal prudence of the Korean government, which allowed it to put in place a plethora 
of post-1997 reforms. Measures such as recapitalization of financial institutions, removal of non- 
performing loans, provision of financial support to families with low-income and social programs 
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like unemployment insurance, inter alia: entailed a lot of fiscal pressures on the State because the 
measures required a lot of public funds. Nonetheless, the Korean government was able to issue 
new bonds to finance the reforms and handle the public debt because of its history of financial 
credibility and fiscal prudence. African governments can learn from this and beware that their 
ability to emerge from a potential financial and/or economic crisis would depend on their 
institutional credibility. 
Then there is the thorny issue of corrupt political elites in Africa (Garoupa & Jellal, 2007; 
Jellal & Bouzahzah, 2013). Narratives on the Korean model have been consistent on the position 
that an effective government is crucial for the success of the KE strategy in order to achieve the 
long-term development objectives. The pivotal role of the Korean government has been very 
remarkable through the development process. The government has been visionary in ensuring 
effective leadership that enabled a conducive macroeconomic environment for KE: training of the 
population, mass education, domestic R&D initiatives, access to modern infrastructure, 
assimilation of foreign technologies, inter alia. Hence, consistent with Tran (2011) the leader 
Park was able to adopt a pragmatic approach to elite corruption. Instead of cracking down on 
them as well as some business men as was urged by the USA, he expropriated their shares in 
banks and obliged them to invest in industries that encouraged import-substitution. The lesson 
from this experience is for African governments to be more pragmatic in their approaches to 
fighting corruption in the continent: a massive industry that account for about 25% of its GDP 
(Asongu, 2014d). 
Overall, based on the policy syndromes presented in Table 5 above, the importance of the 
policy recommendations apply to the following African frontier fundamental characteristics in 
increasing  relevance:  English  Common-law,  Middle-income,  Non-conflict,  Not-Landlocked, 
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Non-Oil exporting, Landlocked, Africa, SSA, North Africa, French Civil-law, Low-income, Oil- 
exporting, Conflict-affected countries. 
 
4.3.2.3.2   Economic incentives 
 
The extensive or export-led development model as we have seen would expose African 
industries to more competition. While the outward-looking strategy would induce intensive R& D 
programs, fiscal incentives from governments are essential for the success. In the same vein, 
protectionist measures are only necessary at the initial stages of development in a given industry 
and should be eventually curtailed. If not, it would encourage complacency in innovation due to 
the absence of exposure to competitive forces. 
Incentives to private credit should be provided by African governments to curtail the 
substantially documented surplus liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006; Nguena & Tsafack, 2014). 
This would stimulate private sector development and respond to the growing stream of literature 
on the need for investment in the continent (Anyanwu, 2007, 2009; Asongu, 2013j) from recent 
African business literature (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2014; Bartels et al., 2009; 
Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012). Moreover, as established by Suh & Chen (2007), Small & Medium 
Size Enterprises: a  sector with more risk or greater capital requirements were aided by the 
research institutes of governments which furnished them with new know-how in terms of 
collaborative R&D as well as novel spinoff government backed firms. 
Based on the information criteria for ‘policy syndrome’ and ‘syndrome free’ fundamental 
characteristics presented in Table 5, the above strategies in increasing relevance apply to: Low- 
income, Conflict-affected, Landlocked, French Civil law, Oil-exporting, North Africa, Africa, 
SSA, Non-Oil exporting, Not-landlocked, Not conflict-affected, English Common law and 
Middle-income countries. 
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4.3.3 Catch-up horizons, cautions, and caveats 
 
While we have presented catch-up rates and timelines needed for full catch-up, we have 
essentially used this dimension of the analysis for insights into potential catch-up horizons in the 
absence of multiple equilibria. Whereas the absolute beta-convergence procedure may have less 
draw-backs than the conditional beta-convergence approach (which has not been implemented for 
reasons already discussed in the methodology section), multiple equilibria remains a caveat even 
in the absence of conditioning information set. For  the above  reasons, we have based the ‘policy 
syndrome’ and ‘syndrome free’ information criteria on sigma convergence dynamics because 
absolute beta catch-up is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for sigma convergence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Africa’s overall knowledge index fell between 2000 and 2009. South Korea’s economic 
miracle is largely due to a knowledge-based development strategy that holds valuable lessons for 
African countries in their current pursuit towards knowledge economies. Using updated data 
(1996-2010),  this  paper  presents  fresh  South  Korean  lessons  to  Africa  by  assessing  the 
knowledge economy (KE) gaps, deriving policy syndromes and providing catch-up strategies. 
The 53 African frontier countries are decomposed into fundamental characteristics of wealth, 
legal origins, regional proximity, oil-exporting, political stability and landlockedness. The World 
Bank’s four KE components are used: education, innovation, information & communication 
technology (ICT) and economic incentives & institutional regime. Absolute beta and sigma 
convergence techniques are employed as empirical strategies. With the exception of ICT for 
which catch-up is not very apparent, in increasing order it is visible in: innovation, economic 
incentives, education and institutional regime. The speed of catch-up varies between 8.66% and 
30.00% per annum with respective time to full or 100% catch-up of 34.64 years and 10 years. 
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Based on the trends and dynamics in the KE gaps, policy syndromes and compelling catch-up 
strategies are discussed. Issues standing on the way to KE in Africa are dissected with great 
acuteness before South Korean relevant solutions are provided. The paper is original in its 
provision of practical policy initiatives drawn from the Korean experience to African countries 
embarking on a transition to KE. 
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  Appendix 1: Definition of variables   
 
  Variables  Signs  Variable definitions  Sources   
 
Panel A: Education 
 
Primary School Enrolment PSE School enrolment, primary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
Secondary School Enrolment SSE School enrolment, secondary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
Tertiary School Enrolment TSE School enrolment, tertiary (% of gross) World Bank (WDI) 
  Education in KE   Educatex First PC of PSE, SSE & TSE PCA 
 
Panel B: Information & Infrastructure 
Internet  Users Internet  Internet users (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
Mobile Cellular Subscriptions  Mobile Mobile subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
Telephone lines Tel Telephone lines (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
Information & Communication 
  Technology (ICT) in KE   
ICTex First PC of Internet, Mobile & Tel PCA 
 
Panel C: Economic Incentives  & Institutional Regime 
Financial Activity (Credit) Pcrbof Private domestic credit from banks and 
other financial institutions 
 
 
World Bank (FDSD) 
Interest Rate Spreads IRS Lending rate minus deposit rate (%) World Bank (WDI) 
  Economic Incentives in KE   Creditex First PC of Pcrbof and IRS PCA 
 
Corruption-Control CC Control of Corruption (estimate): Captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
Rule of Law RL  Rule of Law (estimate): Captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence. 
Regulation Quality RQ Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured 
as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
Political Stability/ No violence PS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): 
Measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness GE  Government Effectiveness (estimate): 
Measures the quality of public services, 
the quality and degree of independence 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of 
government’s commitments to such 
policies. 
Voice & Accountability VA  Voice and Accountability (estimate): 
Measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
 
  Institutional Regime in KE   Instireg First PC of CC, RL, RQ, PS, GE & VA PCA 
 
Panel D: Innovation 
Scientific & Technical Publications STJA Number of Scientific & Technical Journal 
Articles 
 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Trademark Applications Trademark Total Trademark Applications World Bank (WDI) 
Patent Applications Patent Total Residents + Nonresident Patent 
Applications 
World Bank (WDI) 
Innovation in KE Innovex First PC of STJA, Trademarks and Patents World Bank (WDI) 
 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. Educatex is 
the first principal component of primary, secondary and tertiary school enrolments. ICTex: first principal compon ent of mobile, telephone and internet 
subscriptions. Creditex: First PC of Private domestic credit and interest rate spread. P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of 
Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. Instireg (Institutional regime): First PC 
of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Appendix 2: Summary statistics   
  Mean  S.D  Min  Max  Obs.   
 
Educatex (Education) -0.075 1.329 -2.116 5.562 320 
ICTex (Information & Infrastructure) 0.008 1.480 -1.018 8.475 765 
Creditex (Economic Incentive) -0.083 0.893 -4.889 2.041 383 
Instireg (Institutional Regime) 0.105 2.075 -5.399 5.233 598 
Innovation (Innovex) 1.021 2.542 -0.770 8.859 102 
  
  Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis   
 
 Education    ICT   Innovation   Eco Incentive   Institutional Regime  
PSE SSE TSE Educatex Inter Mob Tel ICTex STJA TM Pat Innovex Pcrd IRS Creditex CC RL RQ PS GE VA Instireg 
1.00 0.42 0.27 0.64 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.30 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.24 PSE 
 1.00 0.74 0.91 0.57 0.59 0.82 0.75 0.43 0.57 0.61 0.74 0.62 -0.36 -0.62 0.55 0.55 0.35 0.43 0.59 0.35 0.55 SSE 
  1.00 0.84 0.46 0.40 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.69 0.83 0.61 -0.27 -0.51 0.21 0.29 0.14 0.10 0.35 -0.05 0.21 TSE 
   1.00 0.58 0.51 0.69 0.69 0.48 0.43 0.53 0.65 0.63 -0.24 -0.54 0.41 0.46 0.31 0.29 0.51 0.17 0.43 Educatex 
    1.00 0.72 0.58 0.90 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.45 0.01 -0.42 0.28 0.33 0.21 0.25 0.36 0.18 0.32 Inter 
     1.00 0.47 0.86 0.26 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.45 -0.10 -0.46 0.25 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.16 0.29 Mob 
      1.00 0.78 0.27 0.36 0.41 0.51 0.56 -0.12 -0.54 0.50 0.57 0.33 0.43 0.56 0.33 0.53 Tel 
       1.00 0.39 0.50 0.39 0.50 0.56 -0.08 -0.55 0.39 0.45 0.30 0.37 0.46 0.25 0.43 ICTex 
        1.00 0.83 0.90 0.96 0.78 -0.09 -0.77 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.01 0.36 0.15 0.26 STJA 
         1.00 0.91 0.93 0.89 -0.31 -0.89 0.32 0.26 0.41 0.01 0.50 0.33 0.35 TM 
 1.00 0.97 0.86 -0.34 -0.91 0.47 0.42 0.54 0.27 0.61 0.57 0.55 Pat 
 1.00 0.93 -0.39 -0.94 0.49 0.46 0.60 0.28 0.71 0.50 0.57 Innovex 
  1.00 -0.31 -0.96 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.27 0.64 0.39 0.55 Pcrd 
   1.00 0.54 -0.23 -0.25 -0.32 -0.15 -0.21 -0.16 -0.26 IRS 
    1.00 -0.56 -0.54 -0.52 -0.30 -0.68 -0.51 -0.60 Creditex 
     1.00 0.87 0.72 0.68 0.83 0.66 0.88 CC 
      1.00 0.81 0.79 0.88 0.72 0.95 RL 
       1.00 0.63 0.81 0.70 0.86 RQ 
        1.00 0.64 0.65 0.80 PS 
         1.00 0.68 0.92 GE 
          1.00 0.82 VA 
           1.00 Instireg 
ICT: Information & Communication Technology. Eco: Economic. PSE : Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. Educatex: Edication index 
(first principal component of PSE, SSE & TSE). Inter: Internet Penetration. Mob: Mobile Phone Penetration. Tel: Telephone Subscriptions. ICTex: ICT index (first principal component of Inter, Mob & 
Tel). STJA: Scientific & Technical Journal Articles. TM: Trademark Applications. Pat: Patent Applications. Innovex: Innovation index (first principal component of STJA, TM & Pat). Pcrd: Private 
Domestic Credit. IRS: Interest Rate Spread. Creditex: Economic Incentive index (first principal component of Pcrd & IRS). CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. PS: 
Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. VA: Voice & Accountability. Instireg: Institutional Regime index (first principal component of CC, RL, RQ, PS, GE & VA). 
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Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Category Panels Countries Num 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
levels 
Middle 
Income 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Income 
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 22 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia. 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 31 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, 
  Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.   
 
 
 
Legal 
Origins 
 
English 
Common-law 
 
 
 
French Civil- 
law 
 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 20 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 33 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions 
 
 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, 47 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
  North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania,   Morocco, Tunisia.  6   
 
 
 
Resources 
 
Petroleum 
Exporting 
 
 
Non- 
Petroleum 
Exporting 
 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 10 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan. 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 43 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, 
  Zimbabwe.   
 
 
 
Stability 
 
Conflict Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 12 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe. 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, 
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Non-Conflict Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 41 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, 
  Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia.   
 
 
 
Openness to 
 
Landlocked Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 15 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Sea Not 
landlocked 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 38 
47  
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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